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1
 The release at issue in this case applies equally to all the Appellees in the underlying 
case; therefore Appellees for the purposes of this Appeal will be collectively referred to 
as "Sundance." 
The Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act applies to both 
equine and livestock activities equally, but this case revolves around an equine activity as 
such Appellants will address it in the context of equine activities. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(2011) and Utah R. App. P. Rule 51. This appeal is from the June 
9, 2011 Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion in Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 
UT App 18, 257 P.3d 1049. Ms. Penunuri petitioned the Supreme Court of Utah for 
certiorari and on October 20, 2011 the Supreme Court of Utah graciously granted 
certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue on Certiorari 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in construing the Limitations on Liability for 
Equine and Livestock Activities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201, et seq., to permit 
releases of liability for ordinary negligence? 
Standard of Review 
Matters of statutory construction are purely legal conclusions, which the Supreme 
Court reviews for correctness. Field v. Boyer Company, L.C. 952 P.2d 1078, 1079, (Utah 
1998). 
Citation to the Record 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 137-140, and R. 223-226, during Oral 
Argument at R. 276 pp. 7-14, 30 and Bench Ruling at R. 277 pp. 6, 11. The issue of 
statutory construction was presented to the Utah Court of Appeals in Ms. Penunuri's 
1 
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Opening Brief from pp. 13-31 and in Ms. Penunuri's Reply Brief from pp 1-4 and 8-18 
and during the entire oral argument. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
ADDENDUM A: Utah Code Ann §§ 78B-4-201 to 78B-4-203 (formerly Utah Code 
Ann. §§78-27B-101 to 78-27B-103). Limitations on Liability for Equine 
and Livestock Activities, Act; 
ADDENDUM B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-4-401 to 78B-4-404 (formerly Utah Code 
Ann. §§78-27-51 to 78-27-54). Inherent Risks of Skiing: 
ADDENDUM C: 1992 General Legislative Session, State of Utah, House Bill 362, 
Day 40, Inherent Risk of Livestock Activities, Sponsor 
Representative Adams; 
i 
ADDENDUM D: 2003 General Legislative Session, State of Utah, Senate Bill 123, 
Days 23, 25 and 39; Substitute Senate Bill, Inherent Risk of Equine 
Activities, Sponsor Senator Beverly Evans; 
j 
ADDENDUM E: Trial Court Order; 
ADDENDUM F: Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. 2011 UT App. 183, 257 P.3d 
1049. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: On August 1, 2007, Arizona resident Lisa 
Penunuri and her two friends from Florida arranged with Sundance Resort to go on a < 
guided horse ride at Sundance Stables. Sundance arranged Ms. Penunuri's ride with a 
total of five riders and one guide. The riders consisted of Lisa Penunuri, her two friends 
from Florida, a mother from Park City and her eight-year-old daughter. 
Ms. Penunuri, unlike her friends, was a novice rider and had not been on any 
previous mountainous trail rides. Lisa's friends on the other hand were horse owners and 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
passionate horsewomen. The others, the mother and her eight-year-old daughter, like 
Lisa were very inexperienced beginning riders. The child had never been on a trail ride 
before. On the day Ms. Penunuri sustained her injuries the child was celebrating her 
eighth birthday. Prior to this day, the child was not even eligible to go on a trail ride 
since eight was the minimum age that Sundance allowed. 
The beginning order of the riders were: the guide; the eight-year-old child 
("child"); the child's mother ("mom"); Ms. Penunuri; and then Ms. Penunuri's two friends 
("friends"). The child had problems from the very beginning and at one point the ride 
had to stop so the guide could untangle the child's reins. The order changed when the 
ride began again now with the guide, the friends, the mom, the child, and Ms. Penunuri in 
the rear. The child continued to have problems controlling her horse, and the horse took 
advantage of this to graze. As a result, gaps immediately began to form in the train of 
horses. This continued for some time, causing concern with the friends. The friends 
began to request that the guide slow down or stop and close the gaps. 
The guide informed the friends that she would continue an additional hundred 
yards up the trail and "pony up" (hold the reins of) the child's horse. The guide then 
rounded a bend in the trail and proceeded up the trail an additional hundred plus yards. 
When Ms. Penunuri's horse rounded the bend it suddenly (and unexpectedly to 
Ms. Penunuri) accelerated to catch up with the heard. The unexpected acceleration 
caused Ms. Penunuri to fall to the ground. Ms. Penunuri fell on her head, which resulted 
in fractured neck, specifically a C5-C7 subluxation fracture of her neck with resulting 
spinal cord syndrome. 
3 
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Although the acceleration was unexpected to the inexperienced Ms. Penunuri, it is 
well known in the horse industry that horses separated from the heard will eventually bolt 
to catch up. It is also known within the industry that this behavior is very dangerous to 
any riders, but especially dangerous to a novice rider such as Ms. Penunuri. 
Sundance's own safety instructional manual provided to the guides at the 
beginning of each horseback riding season addresses this issue and stresses the dangers 
associated with gaps in the train of horses. It specifically warns that gaps will cause a 
horse to unexpectedly accelerate and that the guides are required to prevent gaps from 
forming. Sundance was negligent when its guide allowed the gaps to form and was 
further negligent when its guide did not correct the problem when she was specifically 
alerted to the gaps. 
Prior to the ride, all the participants were required to sign the "Sundance 
Horseback Riding Release." The release purports to release Sundance for its own 
negligence. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: On January 19, 2010 the trial 
court heard oral arguments and on January 29, 2010 the trial court ruled from the bench 
in favor of the defendants finding the pre-injury release was valid. The court rationalized 
Sundance was free to waive its own negligence since the legislature did not provide the 
restrictive language in the form of a public policy statement in the Limitations on 
Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities act. On March 31, 2010 defendants 
prepared and the court signed the Finding of Facts, Conclusion of Law, and Order 
Denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiffs1 
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Ordinary Negligence-Based Claims. The trial court March 31, 2010 order was certified 
as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b). 
DISPOSITION AT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: On April 9, 2010 
Ms. Penunuri filed her Notice of Appeal. The Appellate Court determined the 54(b) 
certification was improper and ordered the parties to file memorandum explaining why 
summary disposition should not be granted. On August 4th 2010, this Utah Court of 
Appeals, pursuant to Utah R. of App. P. Rule 5(a) elected to exercise its discretion to 
treat a timely appeal from an order improperly certified as final under rule 54(b) as a 
petition to appeal an interlocutory appeal. The Appeal was fully briefed and on April 18, 
2011 the issues were Submitted on Oral Argument. On June 9, 2011 the Utah Court of 
Appeals ruled: 
[t]he plain language of the Equine Act provides statutory protection to 
equine sponsor from inherent risks of equine activities. The portion of the 
Equine Act excluding negligence, gross negligence, and intentional acts 
from its protection does not invalidate pre-injury releases of ordinary 
negligence. In addition, while the Equine Act and the Skiing Act share a 
number of similarities, only the latter features a declaration of public 
policy. Accordingly, while the supreme court (sic) in Rothstein had a basis 
in the Skiing Act to invalidate pre-injury release, we see no equivalent basis 
in the Equine Act for doing the same. 
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. 2011 UT App. 183, f 20 
On July 5, 2011 Ms. Penunuri filed her Writ of Certiorari. On October 20, 2011 
the Supreme Court of Utah granted Ms. Penunuri Writ and this appeal ensued. 
5 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On August 1, 2007 forty-eight-year-old Lisa Penunuri and two friends 
engaged Sundance for a guided horse ride. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") at 142). 
2. All the riders were required to sign "Sundance Horseback Riding Release" 
(hereinafter "release"). (R. at 190). 
3. The release purports to release Sundance from its own negligence, inherent 
risks, equipment failure, and any man made obstacles. (R. at 190). 
4. The riders consisted of inexperienced and experienced riders, in particular: 
Ms. Penunuri, the eight-year-old child, and her mother were inexperienced novice riders; 
and Ms. Penunuri's two friends from Florida were horse owners and very experienced 
horsewomen, and the professional guide. (R. at 141) 
5. During the ride, the guide permitted the least experienced riders to be in the 
back of the group of riders with an eight-year-old girl second to last. (R at 141). 
6. The eight-year-old girl was unable to control her horse from grazing and as 
a result large gaps began to appear in the train of horses. (R. at 11). 
7. The experienced horsewomen started noticing the gaps and asking the 
guide to slow down or stop. (R. at 11). 
8. The guide informed the horsewomen that she would continue another 
hundred yards up the trail and then "pony up the child." (R. at 11). 
9. The gaps created a dangerous environment that resulted in Ms. Penunuri 
horse to suddenly and unexpectedly accelerate causing Ms. Penunuri to fall off. (R. at 
141) 
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10. As a result of the fall off the horse Ms. Penunuri fractured her neck and 
sustained spinal cord injuries. (R. at 141) 
11. It is well known in the industry and within Rocky Mountain's Outfitters 
guide's training manual that gaps are a hazard that cause a horse to act in a predictable 
and yet dangerous manner by suddenly accelerating to catch up to the herd. (R. at 203). 
12. The trial court determined that in order for the legislature to limit a 
recreational activity sponsor from waiving its own negligence, the act passed by the 
legislature must put the limitation in the form of a public policy, and Sundance was 
therefore free to waive its own negligence since the Limitations on Liability for Equine 
and Livestock Activities Act U.C.A. §78B-4-201 et seq. lacked a public policy statement. 
(R. at 277 p.6 lines 2-17). 
13. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts findings and ruled that 
the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-4-201, et seq. did not restrict a sponsor from limiting his liability in a pre-injury 
release. {Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, at 1f20). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The canons of statutory construction reveal that the Limitations on Liability for 
Equine and Livestock Activities, Act prohibits the use of pre-injury releases to release a 
sponsor of an equine activity from its negligence. The act's three sections read in 
harmony with each other and with other related acts in the same section reveal that the 
legislature intended the equine sponsor would be immune from liability for inherent risks, 
while requiring the sponsor to remain liable for its negligence. The legislative history 
7 
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provides additional support that the Equine Act is a bargain between the equine sponsor, 
the insurance industry, and the participant. 
The Equine and Livestock activity liability limitations section, 78B-4-202, plain 
language states, "an equine activity sponsor . . . is not liable for an injury to or death of a 
participant due to inherent risks associate with these activities, unless the sponsor or 
professional. . . commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence . . ." Permitting a 
sponsor to waive these restrictions in a pre-injury release would make everything after 
"unless" in this section superfluous. 
The Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations section 78B-
4-203(1) requires that a sponsor provide notice to participants of inherent risks of equine 
activities. Section 203(2) requires that notice to be in the form of a sign, document or a 
release to be signed. Section 203(3) requires that the notice include the inherent risks in 
the definition section, 201. The canons of construction, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem 
generis, provides that a general term which follows a specific term is restrained to the 
definitions of the specific term. Here the specific term is notice, and notice is limited to 
inherent risks, therefore, the release is also limited to releasing inherent risks. 
The definition of Inherent risks found in section 201(5) includes dangers that are 
an integral part of equine and livestock activities and does not encompass any negligence 
on the part of the sponsor. Pursuant to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
the natural association of ideas would not permit the sponsor from including its 
negligence as a inherent risks and therefore it would not be permitted to include its 
negligence within the release for a participant to sign. 
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The whole statute interpretation is further supported by a review of the Skiing Act. 
This Supreme Court of Utah determined the Skiing Act prohibited a ski operator from 
limiting his liability in a pre-injury release. The Skiing Act and the Equine Act are 
identical in content and nearly identical in verbiage. The difference being that the equine 
act states directly that a sponsor is to be liable for his negligence, while the skiing act 
does not contain this language as it did contain a public policy statement that this Court 
interpreted to say that an operator could not waive: its negligence. See Rothstein v. 
Snowbird Co. 2007 UT 96,110, 175 P.3d 560. 
The legislative debates in 1992 and 2003 revealed that the insurance industry was 
involved in enacting the legislation to limit a sponsor from having liability for inherent 
risks in order to provide insurance at cheaper rates for those risks that are non-inherent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Canons of Statutory Construction and the Legislative Debates Revealed 
that Utah's Legislature Intended to Prohibit an Equine Activity Sponsor from 
Waiving Its Negligence in a Pre-injury Release. 
The canons of statutory construction demonstrate that the legislature intended that 
the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (hereinafter "Equine 
Act") would prohibit an Equine sponsor from limiting his liability for negligence in a pre-
injury release. In particular, the Equine Act reflects an effort of the legislature to protect 
sponsors of equine recreational activities for liability against injuries resulting from 
inherent risks of the activity or the facility, while at the same time ensuring that sponsors 
manage the facility or operation in a reasonable manner requiring sponsors to act non-
negligently. 
9 
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Whether a contract made in contravention of a statute is void depends upon the 
intent of the Legislature, to be determined not only jfrom the terms and provisions of the 
statute itself, but from the purpose and objective sought to be accomplished by its 
enactment. Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery Co. 210 P. 201,202, 61 Utah 22 (Utah 1922) 
When faced with questions of statutory interpretation the courts1 primary goal is to 
evince the true intent and purpose of the legislature. Archuleta v. St Mark's Hospital, 
2010 UT 36, f 8, 238 P.3d 1044 (Internal cites omitted) (finding the peer and care review 
statutes clear language did not bar claims of patients based upon negligent credentialing). 
The courts must do so by looking at the best evidence of legislative intent, namely the 
plain language of the statute itself. Id. As part of this well-worn canon of statutory 
construction courts must read the plain language as a whole. Id. Under this whole statute 
interpretation the courts must construe provisions in harmony with other provisions in the 
same statute and with statutes under the same and related chapters. Id. The courts do so 
because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one 
general purpose and intent. Id. Consequently, each part of a section should be construed 
in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Id. 
To determine the legislative intent of a statute and the plain language of its text, 
courts have developed canons of statutory construction. Canons of construction are 
basically context-dependent rules of thumb. That is to say, canons are general principles 
many of them of the common-sense variety for drawing inferences about the meaning of 
language. Since language derives much of its meaning from context, canons should not 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be treated as rules of law but rather as axioms of experience that do not preclude 
consideration of persuasive contrary evidence if it exists. 
To reach the 1) legislative intent, and the cardinal rule that the statute should be 
read as a harmonious whole, the Supreme Court of Utah should look to: a) the plain 
language of the statute b) the general, specific and associated words, c) statutory silence, 
and d) the same paraphrasing in similar or related statutes. 
If this Supreme Court finds the plain language is unambiguous, this Court does not 
need to look to other interpretive tools. Id. But "if [this Court determines] the language 
is ambiguous, [this] Court may look beyond the statute to 2) the legislative history ... to 
ascertain the statute's intent." T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2011 UT 28, 
Tf21, 254 P.3d 752. The Supreme Court of Utah determined "[w]hen viewing the act as a 
whole does not eliminate duplicative yet plausible meanings, the statute is ambiguous, 
and we [the Supreme Court of Utah] may resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve 
the ambiguity." Id. These extrinsic tools are used to "discover the underlying intent of 
the legislature." Id. This discovery is "guided by the meaning and purpose of the statute 
as a whole and the legislative history," Id, "and relevant policy considerations." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
1) LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Each of the three sections of the Equine Act read in harmony demonstrate the 
legislature intended that an equine activity sponsor be held liable for its own negligence. 
See Archuleta 2010 UT 36 f 8. The Supreme Court of Utah determined that "in most 
instances, [the courts] proper role when confronted with a statute should be restricted to 
11 
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interpreting its meaning and application as revealed through its text. Rothstein v. 
Snowbird Co. 2007 UT 96, f 10, 175 P.3d 560. 
a) Limitations (Plain language) 
The Equine and livestock activity liability limitations section's 78B-4-202 
(hereinafter "Liability Limitation's Section 202") plain language provides that the sponsor 
is not to be held liable for inherent risks associated with equine activity yet must be held 
liable for its acts or omissions of negligence. Specifically, the Liability Limitation's 
Section provides: 
"(2) An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity 
sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or the death 
of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities, 
unless the sponsor or professional: 
(a)(i) provides the equipment or tack; 
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and 
(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or professional's 
negligence. 
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or 
livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the activity with the 
participant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in the legal possession and control of land or 
facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a 
dangerous condition which was known to or should have been known to the 
sponsor or professional and for which warning signs have not been 
conspicuously posted; 
d(i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, gross 
negligence, or willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant; 
and 
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or 
12 
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(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant. 
U.C.A §78B-4-202(2) 
To allow Sundance to waive these restrictions on the inherent risks in a pre-injury 
release would make everything after "unless" in this Liability Limitations Section 202 
superfluous. A sponsor could negligently: use equipment that was worn out; use horses 
that are too spirited to be on a trail; fail to remove faiilen trees over the trail; fail to warn 
of upcoming cliffs that the trail skirts; or allow large gaps between the riders, creating the 
known hazard that the horses will eventually accelerate to catch up to the heard. 
b) Notice (general and specific terms). 
The plain language of the Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability 
limitations section 78B-4-203 (hereinafter "Notice Section 203" or "Section 203") 
requires an equine activity sponsor to provide notice to the participant, warning the 
participants that horse back riding has certain inherent risks. 
The requirements of the Notice Section 203 provides: 
Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations 
(1) An equine or livestock activity sponsor shall provide notice to 
participants of the equine or livestock activity that there are inherent risks 
of participation and that the sponsor is not liable for certain of those risks. 
(2)Notice shall be provided by: 
(a) posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being used 
for the activity; or 
(b) providing a document or release for the participant, or the 
participant's legal guardian if the participant is a minor, to sign. 
13 
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(3) The notice provided by the sign or document shall be sufficient if it 
includes the definition of inherent risks in Section 78B-4-201 and states 
that the sponsor is not liable for those inherent risks. 
U.C.A §78B-4-203 
The common-sense interpretation of the Notice Section 203 is that in order for an 
operator to take advantage of immunity for the inherent dangers of the Limitations on 
Liability section 202, the operator must provide notice to or warn the participant of the 
possibility of inherent risks or dangers.2 The legislature provided three acceptable 
methods of notice in subsection 203(2), by posting a sign in a prominent location, by 
providing a document, or by providing a release to sign. Subsection 203(1) in the Notice 
Section limits notice only to inherent risks. This interpretation is further supported by the 
canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. 
Where general terms follow specific terms, the rules of construction, including 
noscitur a sociis "it is known from its associates," and ejusdem generis, "of the same 
kind," require that the general terms be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense that is 
analogous to the preceding terms. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, (Utah, 1989) see 
also, Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 369-70, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (1962). In 
Heathman the Court rationalized "that if the broadest meaning of the general expression 
were intended, [the expression] would have been sufficient by itself without any use of 
the specific terms." Id. 
2
 This Notice requirement was amended in 2003 by Sen. Vallentine in order 
for the Equine Act to more closely parallel the Skiing Act, see Legislative 
History, infra. 
14 
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In the Equine Act's Notice Section 203, the general terms "signs to be posted," 
"documents provided" or "releases to be signed" follow the specific term "notice." 
Notice is limited to inherent risks. The canons therefore would limit each of the general 
terms to being analogous of the specific defined term notice and its restriction to inherent 
risks. The purpose of providing the three types of notice makes sense given the broad 
range of activities that the Equine Act3 is intended to cover. A sign would be appropriate 
where no tickets are sold, such as at a 4H event, a document in the form of a ticket would 
be most appropriate for an observer where multiple persons watch an event, such as an 
observer at a polo event, and a signed release4 would be most direct and the most 
appropriate for individuals who are actually participating in an event, such as a trail ride. 
c) Definitions of Inherent risks (Silence) 
Although silence in statutory construction is not always telling, the interpretive 
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another, applies when in the natural association of ideas, the contrast 
between a specific subject matter which is expressed and one which is not mentioned 
leads to an inference that the latter was not intended! to be included within the statute. 
Kocherhans v. Or em City, 2011 UT App. 399, \ 14, P.3d . 
3
 Equine Activities is defined as "equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, 
racing, sales, parades that involve any breeds of eq[uines and any equine disciplines, 
including dressage, hunter and jumper, horse shows, grand pix jumping, multiple day 
events, combined training, rodeos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple chasing, 
hunting, endurance trail riding, and western games, (f) other activities of any type 
including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or spontaneous activities sponsored by an equine 
activity sponsor. U.C.A § 78B-4-201(2). 
15 
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Section 203(1) of the Notice Section limits the "notice provided" to risk that are 
"inherent risks" of Equine Activities. Section 203(3) recognizes that the legislature 
cannot list every possible inherent risk in all types of equine or livestock activities. The 
legislature therefore required that a sponsor provide notice to the participant of the bare 
minimum of inherent risks of equine activities, but it would permit the sponsor to list 
additional inherent risks particular to the type of activity the sponsor ran. It would not 
permit a sponsor from listing additional risks that are not inherent in the activity. 
Inherent risks as defined in Section 201 are risks or dangers that are integral to 
equine or livestock activities that do not encompass any negligence on the part of the 
sponsor. 
Specifically the Definitions9 section 78B-4-201 (hereinafter "Definitions Section 
201"), defines inherent risks as: 
(5) "Inherent risks" with regard to equine or livestock activities 
means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine or 
livestock activities, which may include: 
(a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result 
in injury harm or death to persons around them; 
(b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside 
stimulation such as sound sudden movement, and unfamiliar 
objects or persons, or other animals; 
(c) collision with other animals or objects; or 
(d) the potential for the participant to act in a negligent manner 
that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such 
as failing to maintain control over the animal or not acting 
within his or her ability. 
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The natural association of ideas, would permit a sponsor from waiving such 
inherent risks as are listed and would include other inherent risks such as collisions with 
wild animals, tripping on rocks on the trail or being kicked by the horse in front, but it 
would not include such polar opposites as the negligence of the sponsor. The inference 
of the definitions' list of inherent risks is that the legislature did not intend to include 
negligence of the sponsor as an inherent risk of equine activities. 
d) Skiing Act (Similar Statutes in the same Chapter). 
Under a whole statute interpretation courts must construe provisions in harmony 
with statutes under the same and related chapters. Archuleta, 2010 UT 36, at f8. The 
Skiing Act, which is in the same chapter as the Equine Act and which the Equine Act was 
intended to parallel, prohibits a ski operator from waiving its negligence in a pre-injury 
release. Rothstein 2007 UT 96, f20. The two statutes are parallel in content and similar 
in language; both limit a participant's from recovering from inherent risks of the sport. 
See U.C.A §§78B-4-202(2) and 78B-4-403. Both acts define inherent risks as those that 
are integral to the sport. See U.C.A §§78B-4-201(l) and 78B-4-402(l). Both acts 
require that the operator or sponsor post a sign listing inherent risks of the sport to benefit 
from their respective Acts. See U.C.A. §§78B-4-203 and 78B-4-404. 
Both acts permit a participant to recover from acts of the sponsor or operator's 
negligence: the Equine Act states it explicitly in U.C.A §78B-4-202(2)(d)(i)-(ii); while 
the Skiing Act is presumed to permit it from the language prohibiting the participant from 
recovering from inherent risks. See Rothstein, 2007 UT 96 at % 16. The Skiing Act 
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specifically prohibits a participant from recovering for inherent risks the following Public 
Policy statement: 
The legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number 
of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of non-residents, 
significantly contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that 
few insurance carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protections 
to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have 
risen sharply in recent years due to the confusion as to whether a skier 
assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this 
act, therefore, to clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the 
risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of public policy, no 
person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator for 
injuries resulting from those inherent risks. 
U.C.A. 78B-4-401(2007) 
The Equine Act does not provide the prohibition in a public policy statement; 
rather it is contained in the text of the statute, which states: 
An equine activity sponsor . . . . is not liable for an injury to or the 
death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these 
activities, unless the sponsor or professional: . . . (d)(i) commits an act or 
omission that constitutes negligence, . . and that act or omission causes the 
injury. 
U.C.A 78B-4-202(2) (See full text of the Liability Section 202 supra). (The bold 
highlight in the skiing act and the equine act was added to demonstrate the similar 
language in the two statutes; the italicized area shows additional language found 
only within the Equine Act). 
In Rothstein, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the public policy statement 
above created a bargain between the insurance companies and skiing operators. Rothstein 
2007 UT 96, f 16. The Rothstein Court found that the legislature delineated risks that are 
inherent in the sport where liability would not adhere, from those dangers created by the 
operator's negligence (non-inherent risks) where liability would adhere. Id. When 
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Snowbird extracted a pre-injury release from the participant for its negligent acts, 
Snowbird breached the bargain between it and the participant. Id. 
The Equine Act also delineated the risks between an operator and the participant. 
U.C.A 78B-4-202. The difference between the two statutes is that the Supreme Court of 
Utah in Rothstein had to derive from the public policy statement a prohibition on a ski 
operators' ability to waive its own negligence in a pre-injury release. Unlike the Skiing 
Act, in the Equine Act above the legislature just straight out stated an equine activity 
sponsor is not liable for inherent risks unless he "commits an act or omission of 
negligence." U.C.A. §78B-4-202(2). 
Therefore, if the Equine Act (with its expression that an equine activity sponsor be 
held responsible for its own negligence) is to be in harmony with the Skiing Act (with its 
derived prohibition from the public policy), the Equine Act must be determined to also 
prohibit an equine activity sponsor from waiving its own negligence in a pre-injury 
release. 
The plain language of the Equine Act, using each of the above canons of statutory 
construction, demonstrates that the legislature intended to create a bargain between 
equine sponsors and participants. The bargain was the same in the skiing act, to ensure 
that the equine sponsor would not be liable for inherent risks associated with equine 
activities while the participant would be able to recover for injuries caused by the 
sponsors negligence. 
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2) LEGISLATIVE DEBATES 
The Utah 1992 House of Representatives and 2003 Senate floor debates plainly 
support the legislative intention that the Equine Act was to provide the exact same 
bargain to equine activity sponsors as the Skiing Act provided to ski operators. The 
Supreme Court of Utah in Rothstein held: 
[b]y expressly designating a ski area operator's ability to acquire insurance 
at reasonable rates as the sole reason for bringing the Act into being, the 
Legislature authoritatively put to rest the question of whether ski area 
operators are at liberty to use preinjury releases to significantly pare back or 
even eliminate their need to purchase the very liability insurance the Act 
was designed to make affordable. They are not. The premise underlying 
legislative action to make insurance accessible to ski area operators is that 
once the Act made liability insurance affordable, ski areas would buy it to 
blunt the economic effects brought on by standing accountable for their 
negligent acts. The bargain struck by the Act is both simple and obvious 
from its public policy provision: ski area operators would be freed from 
liability for inherent risks of skiing so that they could continue to shoulder 
responsibility for noninherent risks by purchasing insurance. By extracting 
a preinjury release from Mr. Rothstein for liability due to their negligent 
acts, Snowbird breached this public policy bargain. 
Id at «fl6 
The legislative debates regarding the Equine Act affirmatively f,put to rest the 
question of whether [equine sponsors] are at liberty to use pre-injury releases to 
significantly pare back or even eliminate their need to purchase the very liability 
insurance the [Equine] Act was designed to make affordable." 
The 1992 House of Representatives and the 2003 Senate Floor Debates 
unequivocally demonstrate that the Equine Act's purpose, just like in the Skiing Act's 
public policy statement, was to provide immunity for inherent risks so that the equine 
activity sponsor could shoulder the costs of insuring itself for non-inherent risks. The 
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Equine Act was passed as a parallel bill to the Skiing Act. Also important to the 1992 
and 2003 debates were that the equine activity sponsors would not be able to escape 
liability for their own negligence, fearing that a sponsor would act negligently. 
Specifically, the debates reflected that the intention of the legislature was a bargain 
between the sponsors and the insurance industry so that the sponsor would not be liable 
for inherent risks associated with equine activities in order to afford insurance for its 
negligent acts. 
On February 21, 1992, during the General Legislative Session, House Bill 
HB0362, (then called the Equine Liability Limitation Act), was debated. House of 
Representatives1 Floor Debate, Equine Liability Limitations Act, Hearings on HB0362, 
Day 40, p 1, (February 21, 1992) (See Addendum C) The goal articulated by the billfs 
sponsor, Rep. David M. Adams, was to provide the same protection that the skiing act 
provided to inherent risks without shielding a sponsor for its own negligence. Id at p. 2 
lines 10-19. Specifically Rep. Adams stated: 
Rep. Adams: And it [] does not attempt to remove any liability for negligence, but 
attending a horse event, whether it be a race, a show, a rodeo, or 
what ever, it has with it inherent liability, much the same as when 
you go skiing. 
Id at p. 2 lines 10-19. 
Representative Adams responded to Representative Browns concerns about the 
purpose of the bill, stating that the insurance industry had input into the bill so that equine 
sponsors could obtain insurance at affordable rates. Specifically Adams affirmed: 
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Rep. Adams: [The] language was adopted [] with the hopes and the input from the 
insurance industry that if you do this [the sponsor] can buy 
insurance at a little cheaper rate. 
Realizing, on the same basis that IVe explained before, when you get 
around horses, you are [] exposing yourself to some risk, much the 
same as when you come down a ski slope. 
When you go [skiing] youVe got to know that there's a chance that 
you can fall down and break your leg. 
If you walk behind a horse, there is a chance you're going to get 
kicked. 
And it will limit the liability of the sponsor of that event, because of 
these inherent risks of attending those kinds of events. 
itfatpp. 7-8 lines 14-25, 1-2. 
Rep Adams in response to Rep. Brown's inquiries stated that the bill was not 
intended to limit sponsor's exposures for their own negligence. Specifically affirming 
that: 
Rep. Adams: But if [the sponsors] do anything in the way of negligence if [] they 
bring a wild horse in there knowing that [] I do not think that limits 
their exposure. 
If they provide faulty equipment, it does not limit their exposure. 
I think those limitations were put in [the act]. (They were). It's not 
an attempt to [] insulate these [sponsors] from negligent acts, just an 
attempt to recognize that a horse is not totally manageable. That a 
horse is not a pet. That a horse is [] not as loveable as it sometimes 
appears. 
Id at pp. 8-9, Lines 20-25, and 1-7. 
On February 11, 2003 during the general session, Senator Beverly Evans 
sponsored Senate Bill SB0123 an Amended Substitute to the Equine Liability Act to add 
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Inherent Risks of Livestock Activities. Senate Floor Debate, Inherent Risks of Livestock 
Activities Act, Hearings on SB0123, Day 23, p.l Addendum D, (February 11, 2003) 
Sen. Hillyard was fearful that the Equine Act would recreate "contributory 
negligence" and that the bill would make it so a sponsor who was found 99% negligent 
would not be responsible for the participant who was only 1% negligent. Id at p. 5, Lines 
1-5. Sen. Valentine was worried that the bill would "encourage [equine sponsors] to be 
negligent." Id at p. 6, Lines 15-17. Sen. Hillyard further feared that the equine sponsors 
would not purchase insurance if they were immune from suit. Id at p. 7 Lines 1-2. Id. 
In addition Sen. Hillyard not only feared that a participant would be injured and unable to 
recover, but a sponsor would be exposed if the Supreme Court of Utah were to ever strike 
the bill down. Id at 7, lines 2-6. Although, Sen. Hillyard misinterpreted the statute as 
recreating contributory negligence, his fears of a participant getting injured by the 
sponsor's negligence and being unable to recover, would be realized if the act permitted a 
sponsor to waive his liability for his negligence in a pre-injury release. 
On the second day of hearing the bill, Senator Valentine sponsored an additional 
amendment that required the equine activity sponsor to post signs for inherent risks. See 
Senate Floor Debate, Inherent Risks of Livestock Activities Act, Hearings on SB0123, 
Day 25, p. 2-3, Lines 19-25, 1-8. (February 13, 2003). Senator Valentine's and Senator 
Evan's purpose for this amendment was to ensure that the Equine Act would "parallel" 
the Skiing Act. Id. Defending his amendment Sen. Valentine explained; 
Sen. Valentine: After reviewing the bill, I feel that the bill does do what 
Senator Evans wants [it] to do. I think it's a fair compromise; 
however, to be running parallel, so that the system does the 
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same as which she indicated when she had her debate, [but] to 
run parallel to the same as the ski industry, there need[ed] to 
be the warning sign[s] given, just as in the ski industry. 
So when you have the stockyards set up, and you have the 
livestock being used, it has to give the same kind of warning 
of inherent risk. That's all the amendment does. 
Id at pp. 2-3, Lines 19-25, 1-8. 
Senator Valentine's comments confirms two things: First, that the Equine Act was 
intended to parallel the Skiing Act, affording participants of each activity the same rights; 
and second, that the Notice Section 203 was created to solely provide notice to the 
participant of inherent dangers. 
During the multiple debates between 1992 and 2003, it is apparent that the equine 
industry along with the insurance industry were striking a bargain so that equine activity 
sponsors could limit their liability only to non-inherent risks and to obtain insurance for 
those non-inherent risks. It is also apparent that the senators were concerned that the 
statute would inadvertently allow an equine activity sponsor the ability to have complete 
immunity for its negligence and therefore drafted the Act to prevent this from occurring. 
The legislative debates altogether support Ms. Penunurifs plain language argument that 
the legislature intended that an equine sponsor cannot avoid its liability for its negligence 
in a pre-injury release. Therefore when Sundance extracted a mandatory release from Ms. 
Penunuri, Sundance breached its legislative created bargain between it and Ms. Penunuri. 
He * * 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, respectfully request 
that this Supreme Court of Utah find in their favor, overturn Utah Court of Appeals 
opinion 2011 UT App. and allow them to pursue their negligence claims against 
Sundance et al. 
Respectfully submitted this 17 day of January 2012. 
STRIEPER LAW FIRM 
ERTOT ROB . STRIEPER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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A/estlaw. 
J.CA. 1953§78B-4-201 
brmerly cited as UT ST § 78-27b-101 
Zest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code \ 
»^ g Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability 
ngPart 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities 
«> «• § 78B-4-201. Definitions 
s used in this part: 
) "Equine" means any member of the equidae family. 
\) "Equine activity" means: 
(a) equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, racing, sales, or parades that involve any breeds of equines and any equine 
disciplines, including dressage, hunter and jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping, multiple-day events, combined training, rodeos, 
driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple chasing, hunting, endurance trail riding, and western games; 
(b) boarding or training equines; 
(c) teaching persons equestrian skills; 
(d) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine owned by another person regardless of whether the owner receives monetary or other 
valuable consideration; 
'e) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine by a prospective purchaser; or 
f) other equine activities of any type including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or spontaneous activities sponsored by an equine 
tctivity sponsor. 
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-.j -r ««,.*«.«., &IV7MF, guvwiunuiiai ^mny, v^ iuu, parmersnip, or corporation, wnetfter operating for 
)fit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for an equine activity, including: 
a) pony clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, 4-H programs, therapeutic riding programs, and public and private schools and 
>ostsecondary educational institutions that sponsor equine activities; and 
b) operators, instructors, and promoters of equine facilities, stables, clubhouses, ponyride strings, fairs, and arenas. 
"Equine professional" means a person compensated for an equine activity by: 
a) instructing a participant; 
b) renting to a participant an equine to ride, drive, or be a passenger upon the equine; or 
c) renting equine equipment or tack to a participant. 
"Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock activities means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine 
ivestock activities, which may include: 
a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them; 
b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects,, 
ersons, or other animals; 
z) collisions with other animals or objects; or 
i) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing 
•) maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability. 
"Livestock" means all domesticated animals used in the production of food, fiber, or livestock activities. 
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(a) livestock shows, fairs, competitions, performances, packing events, or parades or rodeos that involve any or all breeds of 
livestock; 
(b) using livestock to pull carts or to carry packs or other items; 
(c) using livestock to pull travois-type carriers during rescue or emergency situations; 
(d) livestock training or teaching activities or both; 
(e) taking livestock on public relations trips or visits to schools or nursing homes; 
(f) boarding livestock; 
(g) riding, inspecting, or evaluating any livestock belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary 
consideration or other thing of value for the use of the livestock or is permitting a prospective purchaser of the livestock to ride, 
inspect, or evaluate the livestock; 
(h) using livestock in wool production; 
(i) rides, trips, or other livestock activities of any type however informal or impromptu that are sponsored by a livestock activity 
sponsor; and 
(j) trimming the feet of any livestock. 
I "Livestock activity sponsor" means an individual, group, governmental entity, club, partnership, or corporation, whether operating 
* profit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for a livestock activity, including: 
a) livestock clubs, 4-H programs, therapeutic riding programs, and public and private schools and postsecondary educational 
nstitutions that sponsor livestock activities; and 
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b) operators, instructors, and promoters of livestock facilities, stables, clubhouses, fairs, and arenas. 
"Livestock professional" means a person compensated for a livestock activity by: 
a) instructing a participant; 
b) renting to a participant any livestock for the purpose of riding, driving, or being a passenger upon the livestock; or 
c) renting livestock equipment or tack to a participant. 
) "Participant" means any person, whether amateur or professional, who directly engages in an equine activity or livestock activity, 
ardless of whether a fee has been paid to participate. 
)(a) "Person engaged in an equine or livestock activity" means a person who rides, trains, leads, drives, or works with an equine or 
;stock, respectively. 
b) Subsection (11 )(a) does not include a spectator at an equine or livestock activity or a participant at an equine or livestock activity 
yho does not ride, train, lead, or drive an equine or any livestock. 
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J.C.A. 1953 § 78B-4-202 
'ormerly cited as UT ST § 78-27b-102 
best's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
K
m ChaP ler 4. Limitations on Liability 
*gPart 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities 
«• ^  § 78B-4-202. Equine and livestock activity liability limitations 
[) It shall be presumed that participants in equine or livestock activities are aware of and understand that there are inherent risks 
>sociated with these activities. 
1) An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or 
e death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities, unless the sponsor or professional: 
(a)(i) provided the equipment or tack; 
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and 
(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or professional's negligence; 
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the 
activity with the participant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession and control of land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because 
of a dangerous condition which was known to or should have been known to the sponsor or professional and for which warning 
signs have not been conspicuously posted; 
d)(i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, gross negligence, or willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the 
participant; and 
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e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant. 
This chapter does not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, a livestock activity 
>nsor, or a livestock professional who is: 
a) a veterinarian licensed under Title 58, Chapter 28, Veterinary Practice Act, in an action to recover for damages incurred in the 
:ourse of providing professional treatment of an equine; 
b) liable under Title 4, Chapter 25, Estrays and Trespassing Animals; or 
c) liable under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Utah Product Liability Act. 
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LC.A. 1953 § 78B-4-203 
ormerly cited as UT ST § 78-27b-103 
Zest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
^Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability 
fygPart 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities 
^ ^ § 78B-4-203. Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations 
) An equine or livestock activity sponsor shall provide notice to participants of the equine or livestock activity that there are inherent 
sks of participating and that the sponsor is not liable for certain of those risks. 
) Notice shall be provided by: 
(a) posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being used for the activity; or 
(b) providing a document or release for the participant, or the participant's legal guardian if the participant is a minor, to sign. 
) The notice provided by the sign or document shall be sufficient if it includes the definition of inherent risk in Section 78B-4-201 
d states that the sponsor is not liable for those inherent risks. 
Notwithstanding Subsection (1), signs are not required to be posted for parades and activities that fall within Subsections 78B-4-
l(2)(f)and(7)(c),(e),(g),(h),anda). 
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Vestlaw. 
f.CA. 1953 § 78B-4-401 
ormerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-51 
Zest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
* j Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability 
*g Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing 
. * . • § 78B-4-401. Public policy 
he Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of 
presidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide 
ability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent years 
je to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, 1 FN 11 therefore, to 
arify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are 
herent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator 
•r injuries resulting from those inherent risks. 
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:.A. 1953§78B-4-402 
•merly cited as UT ST § 78-27-52 
jst's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
ritle78B. Judicial Code 
*U Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability 
i^ g Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing 
„+_> § 78B-4-402. Definitions 
used in this part IFNil: 
"Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of recreational, competitive, or 
Sessional skiing, including, but not limited to: 
a) changing weather conditions; 
b) snow or ice conditions as they exist or may change, such as hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, 
;ut-up snow, or machine-made snow; 
c) surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, trees, and other natural 
)bjects; 
d) variations or steepness in terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, and other 
errain modifications such as terrain parks, and terrain features such as jumps, rails, fun boxes, and all other constructed and natural 
Matures such as half pipes, quarter pipes, or freestyle-bump terrain; 
e) impact with lift towers and other structures and their components such as signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, or water 
}ipes; 
f) collisions with other skiers; 
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(h) the failure of a skier to ski within the skier's own ability. 
) "Injury" means any personal injury or property damage or loss. 
) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other types of 
i jumping, using skis, sled, tube, snowboard, or any other device. 
) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other type of ski jumping, 
id snowboarding. 
) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents, officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area. 
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CA. 1953§78B-4-403 
rmerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-53 
est's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
i^l Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability 
m^ Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing 
^^ § 78B-4-403. Bar against claim or recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in sport 
^withstanding anything in Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim against, or recover 
>m, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. 
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.C.A. 1953§78B-4-404 
>rmerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-54 
est's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*ig Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability 
*B Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing 
^ ^ § 78B-4-404. Trail boards listing inherent risks and limitations on liability 
:i area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations within each ski area which shall include a list of the 
herent risks of skiing, and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this part. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
SPEAKER: Madam Reading Clerk. 
READING CLERK: House Bill No. 362. Equine 
Liability Limitation Advocacy; Representative Adams. 
SPEAKER: Representative Adams? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: This is a companion 
bill to the bill we discussed yesterday, about limiting 
liability for participants in an equine event. 
SPEAKER: Uh-huh. 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: And it — it -- it 
does not attempt to remove any liability for 
negligence, but attending a horse event, whether it be 
a race, a show, a rodeo, or whatever, it has with it 
inherent liability, much the same as when you go 
skiing. 
And in this, we put in statutes that — that 
does limit the liability of sponsors, whether they be 
profit or non-profit corporations, sponsoring those 
equine events. 
We'll yield the question, if there are any? 
SPEAKER: Representative Lyles? 
REPRESENTATIVE LYLES: Thank you. Question 
of the sponsor. 
SPEAKER: Will the sponsor yield? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: Yes. 
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REPRESENTATIVE LYLES: Representative Adams, 
has this had a committee hearing? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: This bill did not 
have a committee hearing. 
REPRESENTATIVE LYLES: Does it have a fiscal 
note? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: This bill — Ifm sure 
it does have a fiscal note. And it's -- there's no 
fiscal impact to the state. 
SPEAKER: Representative Stephens. 
REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS: Just a couple of 
quick questions. 
On page three, Representative Adams, where 
you're talking about the liability limitations 
themselves. This has come up rather quick, and so I 
haven't had a chance to read through this, but --
An equine activity sponsor/equine 
professional is not liable for an injury to or the 
death of participant engaged in the activity unless the 
sponsor --
I guess the one I'm concerned about is b(i) 
and b(ii). Unless the respon — so they would be 
responsible if they've provided the horse and failed to 
make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine 
whether the --
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This is the part that I was reading, and I 
was -- wasn't sure what this means exactly. 
If they provide the horse, then they have 
to -- and they fail to make reasonable and prudent 
efforts to determine whether the participant could 
engage safely in the horse activity -- or equine 
activity, what kind of steps is this requiring them to 
do to see if the participant --
Would this mean like they'd have to be a --
like a licensed rodeo or something? Or -- how --
what -- what steps could they do to make sure that this 
person -- how are they going to know if this person can 
reasonably engage in those types of activities? And 
then under B, the horse, the equine -- doesn't equine 
mean horse? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: The purpose of the 
Act, much like the ski -- is done in the ski industry, 
it simply says if you behave -- if you go the -- to 
these activities, you have to recognize that there's a 
chance you can be hurt; but at the same time, it — 
we're not intending to let the sponsors of those 
activities -- for example, if you're going to a dude 
ranch to ride a horse, this does not limit the 
liability of the owner of that dude ranch to pro -- if 
he provides you with a wild bucking horse, knowing that 
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1 you cannot handle it, that does not remove the 
2 liability from that -- that particular person, but --
3 REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS: Well, I guess — 
4 that -- that's my point. How do they know if a 
5 particular person can handle a wild bucking horse? 
6 Say it's a rodeo, and you have a rider 
7 that's going to ride these broncos, and the bronco 
8 throws him and he's injured. They would -- they would 
9 still be liable or they wouldn't be liable? 
10 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: Well, in the example 
11 you're putting to me, the entrant has to pay a fee, and 
12 he absolutely knows what he's doing, and he's 
13 participating in a — in the event, acknowledging the 
14 risk. And when he does that, I — I think it's implied 
15 there. I'm not an attorney, but I think it's implied 
16 there that -- that he knows what's happening and, 
17 therefore, if he does get injured, knowing the type of 
18 activity, he's a member of the Professional Rodeo 
19 Cowboy's Association, I'm just speculating that yes, 
20 this would limit the liability of the rodeo people. 
21 REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS: Look at line 22. 
22 Unless the sponsor -- reading -- so the 
23 I sentence makes sense, "Unless the sponsor or 
24 professional fail to make reasonable and prudent 
25 I efforts to determine whether the equine could behave 
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safely with the participant. 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: I — I'm not — in 
this piece of legislation, we're not trying -- there 
are a lot of people that rent horses out to dudes on a 
one-, or a two-, or a three-hour basis. And on this 
legislation, I'm not attempting to limit their 
liability if they bring in a -- an unmanageable horse 
for an inexperienced rider; but at the same time, if 
you go to a rodeo, you expect an unmanageable horse. 
REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS: Okay. I see what 
you're saying. Okay. Thank you. 
SPEAKER: Representative Brown. 
REPRESENTATIVE BROWN: Thank you, 
Mr. Speaker. 
Will the sponsor yield to a question? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: Yes. 
SPEAKER: Will the sponsor yield? 
Proceed. 
REPRESENTATIVE BROWN: Tell me how this 
could impact the liability at a horse pulling contest? 
Now I notice, in the definition of equine 
activities that it's listed, but under this particular 
issue that Representative Stevenson just brought up --
Stephens just brought up, it indicates that -- that 
fail to make reasonable and prudent efforts to 
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1 J determine whether the equine could behave safely with 
2 the participant. Now, I don't quite understand that. 
3 A lot of times a person, you know, in -- in those 
4 contests, an animal gets excited. 
5 A couple of years ago, out in Draper, for 
6 example, we had a horse get over a fence, go right over 
7 a fence and land in the lap of some people. Is this 
8 exempting us from liability, or increasing our 
9 liability? 
10 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: I don't know. The 
11 only thing I can tell you is this language was adopted 
12 from the states of Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and two or 
13 three other states who have enacted this very 
14 legislation, and it was done with the hopes and the 
15 input of the insurance industry, that if you do this, 
16 you can buy insurance at a little cheaper rate. 
17 Realizing, on the same basis that I've 
18 explained before, when you get around horses, you 
19 are -- you are exposing yourself to some risk, much the 
20 same as when you come down a ski slope. When you go in 
21 there, you've got to know that there's a chance that 
22 J you can fall down and break your leg. 
23 If you walk behind a horse, there's a chance 
24 you're going to get kicked. 
25 And it will limit the liability of the 
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sponsor of that event, because of these inherent risks 
of attending those kind of events. 
REPRESENTATIVE BROWN: Would this -- would 
this have any impact on the activity we see downtown, 
with the carriages, at all? Could this be a benefit 
to them in dealing with that liability issue? 
I think the thing to do -- you're trying to 
do is good. I'm surely not speaking against it, 
because this has been a big issue. In fact, the 
association, the Horse Pulling Association, usually has 
their own liability insurance, as do most of the 
counties or cities where you go to put on a contest. 
And I hope this would have the effect you're 
talking about, limit the liability so that this 
insurance could be purchased cheaper. 
The activity, the commercial activity, does 
it affect that at all, do you know? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: I — I -- I'm sorry, 
I can't answer -- I don't know. 
But -- if they do anything in the way of 
negligence, if -- if they bring a wild horse in there 
knowing that — I don't -- I do not think that limits 
their exposure. 
If they provide faulty equipment, it does 
not limit their exposure. 
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1 I -- I think those limitations were put in 
2 there. It's not — and it's — it's not an attempt 
3 to — to insulate these people from negligent acts, 
4 just an attempt to recognize that a horse is not 
5 totally manageable. That a horse is not a pet. That a 
6 horse is -- is -- is not as lovable as it sometimes 
7 appears. 
8 REPRESENTATIVE BROWN: And the public should 
9 recognize that. 
10 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: Yes. 
11 REPRESENTATIVE BROWN: Of course I -- I 
12 guess the issue of the equipment is certainly up to 
13 interpretation by a judge. 
14 You know, I know of a case -- and of course 
15 I'm talking strictly from the point of the view of the 
16 draft horses now, but I've seen a couple of cases at 
17 pulling matches where these horses get excited, and you 
18 pull them in with a stone rope to hook up, and a snap 
19 on the line has broken. 
20 If you've been to one, there's sometimes 
21 three or four people hanging on the lines to hold the 
22 J horses. 
23 Down at the state fair, for example, last 
24 J September, I was assisting a friend of mine with a 
25 I team. And he had good lines, but his horses were 
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excited, and they were going into the boat, and with he 
and I both dragging on the lines, one of the lines 
snapped. 
of course 
we starte 
the kind 
all of th 
crowd was 
questions 
think it' 
amend or 
support i 
And the minute that snapped, that pressure, 
that changed the direction of the horses, and 
d off through the crowds. 
Fortunately, we got them shut down. 1 
And that was even a bigger risk, recognizing 1 
of conditions at the fair grounds because of 
e rain, we were pulling in an area where the 
very accessible there. I 
And I -- I guess I just have had those J 
And I think the intent is very good. I J 
s something we might have to look at and could I 
change if there's problems, but I certainly 1 
t. 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: thank you. 
SPEAKER: Representative Rise. 
REPRESENTATIVE RISE: Thank you. 
Sponsor yield? 
SPEAKER: Will the sponsor yield? 
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: yes. 
SPEAKER: Proceed. 
REPRESENTATIVE RISE: Representative Adams, 
I too support what we're trying to do, and trying to 
1 clarify in my mind, what -- what is meant by limited 
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1 liability? 
2 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: Come again? 
3 REPRESENTATIVE RISE: What is meant by 
4 limited liability? Is there a figure? Or number? Or 
5 does that mean there's no liability? What -- I see no 
6 figures, or --
7 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: Well, it — I 
8 REPRESENTATIVE RISE: Whatfs the definition 
9 of that, I guess. 
10 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: I believe that's 
11 defined on page three, lines 12 through 13, where it 
12 says the "Is not liable for injury or death of a 
13 participant in the event -- unless he is guilty in — 
14 in the -- in those lines listed below that. 
15 REPRESENTATIVE RISE: In other words, 
16 I limited would be there would be no liability. 
17 In other words, there's not a certain point. 
18 In other words, limited, if it -- if it wasn't 
19 intentional, or it wasn't your fault, then virtually 
20 there would be no liability is what you're saying. 
21 REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS: That's correct. 
22 REPRESENTATIVE RISE: Okay. Thank you. 
23 SPEAKER: Representative Tuttle. 
24 REPRESENTATIVE TUTTLE: Thank you, 
25 Mr. Speaker. 
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You know, every year out in Magna, we have a 
rodeo. And everybody knows when they to go rodeos with 
people that are riding in the rodeo, if they get hurt, 
they're not going to sue anybody. 
Sometimes you might worry about somebody in 
the stands that gets too close and gets kicked or 
something like that, but I think people understand that 
when you're around livestock and horses, sometimes they 
do kick. 
I think this is more of a human sense bill 
here, that we've got to have some common sense. And I 
think this just takes the responsibility off the 
sponsors, for somebody being stupid. 
(Whereupon, the recording 
was concluded.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
SPEAKER: Now go to First Substitute Senate 
Bill 123. 
READING CLERK: Senate Bill 123, Inherent 
Risk of Livestock Activities; Senator Beverly Evans. 
SPEAKER: Senator Evans. 
SENATOR EVANS: Thank you, Mr. President. 
I need to move some amendments that are just 
clerical, if I could do that. 
SPEAKER: Okay. 
SENATOR EVANS: On line — or page four, 
line 115 reinstate the double i and delete three. 
And then on page four, line 116, delete E 
and insert D. 
And on page four line 117, delete two and 
insert three. 
If I could hand that to the cercla. It's 
just an editing error. 
SPEAKER: Okay. 
SENATOR EVANS: Okay? So I need to move 
that ~ 
SPEAKER: Do you have those, Sandy? 
Okay, very good. 
I'll place those amendments. All in favor 
of those amendments, say aye. 
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1 (AYES HEARD.) 
2 SPEAKER: Opposed? 
3 I Motion passes. 
4 Now to the bill. 
5 SENATOR EVANS: Thank you, Mr. President. 
6 Several years ago, when we were talking 
7 about equine events, we wanted to try and limit the 
8 liabilities, and we overlooked including the livestock 
9 activities. And this allows us, so we don't have 
10 extreme liabilities for young people who choose to 
11 participate in livestock shows, or people who choose 
12 to -- to participate in professional livestock 
13 activities, it includes a definition of livestock. 
14 So it just puts a limitation so that we can 
15 continue these type of activities without always being 
16 at risk of liability. 
17 SPEAKER: Okay. 
18 We go to Senator Allen first, then to 
19 Senator Hillyard. 
20 SENATOR ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. President. 
21 Some of these programs are very active in my 
22 senate district, and I know that we have a lot of 
23 injuries. In fact, in one area we have something 
24 1 almost weekly. 
25 I But is this going to limit their access to 
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recover healthcare costs, any of those issues? 
What kind of caps are going to be on those? 
SENATOR EVANS: No. It doesn't. It just 
goes back -- you know when you go back and have these 
extreme losses, it puts a limitation so that you don't 
end up with, you know, hundreds and thousands of 
dollars. And it puts just a (inaudible) limitation on 
those. 
SENATOR ALLEN: It --
SENATOR EVANS: — recovered healthcare 
costs or any injury costs. Or property damage. 
SENATOR ALLEN: And if I may ask another 
question of the sponsor. 
What is that limit? I didn't find it 
quickly looking through that bill. 
SENATOR EVANS: It's in another section of 
the code. We just --
SENATOR ALLEN: Is the $400,000 malpractice 
on it? 
SENATOR EVANS: No. 
SENATOR ALLEN: That's the question I have. 
I'll have to try to find it here. Thank you. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I guess my concern with 
the bill is -- is there was a recent Utah Supreme Court 
case that struck down the releases that many people 
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used for activities. And as I read the bill, it really 
appears to me that we're recreating a thing that used 
to be called contributory negligence, which, if you are 
one percent at fault and the other was 99 percent at 
fault, you would recover nothing. 
We changed that a number of years to 
comparative negligence, so that if you're 40 percent at 
fault and the other person is 60 percent at fault, and 
your damages were say $10,000, you'd get 60 percent of 
it. 
If it were equal, 50/50, you'd recover 
nothing. And it became a more fair system. 
And I guess I'm concerned, as I read this, 
because I don't read an exemption for gross negligence. 
For people who may be running a fair and know they've 
got a dangerous animal there, and -- and don't really 
particularly be worried about it because they have no 
liability. 
And I think what we've done on most of these 
is if we have granted some type of limited immunity, 
we've made it limited immunity, but also excluded out 
of it gross negligence in that regard. 
And I think, in answer to Senator Allen's 
question, there would be no recovery at all. 
Now, I can understand, if I'm out working in 
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a 4H thing, and dealing with animals all the time, that 
I should be expected to know more about that. But if 
I'm somebody who just came in from the country, and --
or from the city, and went to ride a horse or go to a 
fair or something, and really had never been around 
animals my whole life, and something happened and maybe 
I am at fault. Maybe I'm 20 percent at fault. But if 
people looking at it realistically said, you know, the 
people who put this together were probably 80 percent 
at fault of this. They had an animal there they knew 
was dangerous, and they didn't take proper care of it, 
but yet what we've done in this bill is the person 
who's 20 percent at fault would get nothing because we 
presume that everyone knows how to handle animals and 
do animals. And the argument really is is that it 
encourages us to be negligent. It encourages us to not 
worry about taking care. 
I would be more comfortable if the bill were 
structured more like -- you know, if there's gross 
negligence and a different standard, then this type of 
a -- of a (inaudible). 
So I have problems with this bill, and I'll 
have to probably vote no, even though I — you know, I 
agree with Senator Allen, I have a lot of people that 
would probably like it, but as a practical matter, I 
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hate to pass it, people then think, Ahh, I'm safe. I 
don't have to worry about insurance. Being struck down 
by the Supreme Court, as some of these statutes we've 
done, then suddenly they're exposed with no insurance 
coverage at all. And I think that's not fair to the 
people either. 
SPEAKER: Thank you. 
Senator -- do you want to reply to that, 
Senator Evans? Or do you want to just go on with other 
question? 
SENATOR EVANS: Yes, (inaudible). If you'll 
read through the definition that we have here in this 
bill, we had defined very specifically the type of 
activities, and so many of the examples that Senator 
Hillyard used would not be applicable to here. 
It has livestock shows, competition, 
performances, pack event, or parades that are involved 
pulling carts. Teaching activities. Public relations. 
It has a rides, trips, and other livestocks 
attributing a fee. 4H activities and those types of 
things are well defined within there what has the 
limitations of liability. 
SPEAKER: Senator Gladwell? 
SENATOR GLADWELL: Thank you, Mr. President. 
I did have a question of the sponsor, if I might. 
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I just wondered, and I may have missed your 
original presentation. Is there a -- is there a 
problem currently, or are you anticipating problems? 
I mean, have there been a rash of lawsuits, 
or is there a specific case or cases that point to 
concerns? Or is this kind of an anticipatory 
legislation? 
SENATOR EVANS: Thank you, Senator. 
What we're finding, more and more, because 
of the liability environment in which we are 
participating in, that many people do not want to allow 
any type of use of the livestock or anything because 
their so afraid of any type of liability when we have 
these livestock shows and different activities, or a 
kids even sponsored livestock shows and those type of 
things. People are so concerned because of the 
liability, even though they own the animal and most of 
them recognize they're inherent risks when they deal 
with that livestock. So yes, we are starting to have a 
lot of challenges and problems. 
SENATOR GLADWELL: Well, I wondered, is that 
a general concern people are expressing? They're 
worried or concerned? Or is there -- have there been 
lawsuits? I'm just wondering, trying to separate 
reality from potential or probability. 
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1 SENATOR EVANS: Who brought this bill to me 
2 were the people in charge of a livestock show out in my 
3 senate district, and said we're getting to the point 
4 where people don't even want to participate in any of 
5 these type of activities, and we need a clearer 
6 definition that we recognize there are inherent risks, 
7 and we try to have a limited liability. 
8 SENATOR GLADWELL: So there's no -- we can't 
9 really point to any actual --
10 SENATOR EVANS: Right. 
11 SENATOR GLADWELL: -- recent lawsuit or 
12 I anything? 
13 SENATOR EVANS: There has not been a recent 
14 lawsuit. It's just the fear factor out there, more 
15 than anything. And it's one we have done for the 
16 lack -- or for the horse industry, the equine, and we 
17 felt like if we included this for livestock it would be 
18 more encompassing. 
19 SPEAKER: Senator Valentine? 
20 SENATOR VALENTINE: Thank you, 
21 Mr. President. 
22 I have some concerns with this bill as well. 
23 If I read it correctly, on line 61, if a 
24 person uses an animal that they know is an aggressive 
25 J or is not suitable for pulling a cart in a 24th of July 
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parade, and that animal gets away from them, and gets 
onto the parade route and injures people, that person 
is immune from any liability. There's no cap. There's 
no $400,000 cap like there is in the state law. 
There's no cap. It just — he's immune. 
If, in fact, that's the case, and I find it 
throughout the bill and various different places like 
that, that gives me some real cause for concern. 
In fact, if I could, Mr. President, ask the 
sponsor a question. 
Is that what you intend in this, Senator? 
SENATOR EVANS: No, it isn't. 
You know, Mr. President, I think at this 
time I'd like to circle the bill, and then I'd be able 
to answer a lot of those questions off the floor, 
because it's about that time. 
SPEAKER: Why don't we do that. Yeah. 
SENATOR VALENTINE: Mr. President, I'd like 
to move to circle. 
SPEAKER: Thank you. All in favor say aye. 
(AYES HEARD.) 
SPEAKER: Opposed? 
The motion passes. I think we're at that --
(Whereupon, the recording 
was concluded.) 
* * * 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 SPEAKER: Senator Evans? 
3 SENATOR EVANS: Mr. President, I'd like to 
4 remove the circle on First Substitute Senate Bill 123. 
5 SPEAKER: Motion to remove circle on 123. 
6 1 All in favor say aye. 
7 (AYES HEARD.) 
8 SPEAKER: Motion passes. The bill is before 
9 us. 
10 SENATOR EVANS: Thank you, Mr. President. 
11 This was the Inherent Risk of Livestock 
12 Activities that we had a chat -- or we started 
13 discussing yesterday. And I think we're all in a 
14 consensus, and so I'd like to move to Senator Valentine 
15 to make an amendment. 
16 SPEAKER: Senator Valentine? Thank you. 
17 SENATOR VALENTINE: Thank you, 
18 Mr. President. 
19 I'd move the amendment, Amendment No. 2, 
20 under my name, dated February 13th, 2003. 
21 Let me explain that amendment. 
22 After reviewing the bill, I feel that the 
23 bill does do what Senator Evans wants to do. I think 
24 it' s a fair compromise; however, to be running 
25 I parallel, so that the system does the same as which she 
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indicated when she had her debate, to run parallel to 
the same as the ski industry, there meeds to be the 
warning sign given, just as there is in the ski 
industry. 
So when you have the stockyards set up, and 
you have the livestock being used, it has to give the 
same kind of warning of inherent risk. That's all the 
amendment does. 
SPEAKER: -- any questions on the amendment? 
Seeing none, I'll place the motion. 
All in favor of the amendment say aye. 
(AYES HEARD.) 
Opposed say no. 
The motion passes. 
The bill is before us as amended, Senator. 
SENATOR EVANS: Thank you, Mr. President. 
Yesterday we had an interesting discussion. 
People wanted to talk about the limitations of 
liability on equine activities, and we've added 
livestock activities. 
We already had this whole section — or we 
had a section that defined this in the Code, but when 
we went back it was not really clear to include 4H and 
a lot of different other activities so that --
We can't always predict animal behavior, and 
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1 that -- if you, for example, have a youngster who's 
2 trimming a calf to get him ready for the livestock 
3 show, he happens to kick, we can't predict that type of 
4 behavior. So it just limits the liability. But 
5 1 anything that is gross negligence, the issues of 
6 equipment or everything, none of that is exempt. 
7 And there was a question on that yesterday, 
8 and we just want to clarify that. There was not time 
9 1 to be able to clarify that yesterday. 
10 SPEAKER: Thank you. Any question of 
11 Senator Evans? 
12 Seeing none, Senator? 
13 SENATOR EVANS: I would call for a question 
14 on -- for Substitute Senate Bill 123. 
15 SPEAKER: That will be read for the third 
16 1 time roll call vote. 
17 READING CLERK: Senator Allen? 
18 (AYE.) 
19 READING CLERK: Aaron? 
20 (AYE.) 
21 READING CLERK: Bale? 
22 (AYE.) 
23 READING CLERK: Blackham? 
24 (AYE.) 
25 READING CLERK: Bramble? 
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(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Bethers? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Davis? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Demitrich? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Eastman? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Evans? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Evans? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Grippa? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Hatch? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Hellewell? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Hickman? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Hillyard? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Jenkins? 
(AYE.) 
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READING CLERK: Julander? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Knutson? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Maine? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Steele? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Stevenson? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Thomas? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Valentine? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Waddoups? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Walker? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: Wright? 
(AYE.) 
READING CLERK: President Minsale? 
(AYE.) 
SPEAKER: First Substitute Senate Bill 123 
ed. 24 aye votes, no nay votes, and 5 being 
sses to the third reading calendar. We 
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have -• 
(Whereupon, the recording 
was concluded.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
SPEAKER: Representative Ure. 
REPRESENTATIVE URE: Mr. Speaker, I would 
move that we move from the House calendar to the Senate 
calendar. 
SPEAKER: The motion is that we move from 
the House calendar to the Senate calendar. 
Discussion of the motion? 
Seeing none, all in favor say aye. 
(AYES HEARD.) 
SPEAKER: Opposed say no? 
Motion passes. We're on the Senate 
calendar. 
Representative Ure. 
SENATOR EVANS: Mr. Chairman — or 
Mr. Speaker, having voted on the prevailing side, I 
would move that we reconsider our actions on Senate 
Bill 123, title is Inherent Risk of Livestock 
Activities, for the purpose of making an amendment. 
SPEAKER: Was there — 
Representative Ure, therefs -- which -- you 
said 123, but there's a substitute. Wasn't there? 
REPRESENTATIVE URE: It's -- it's First 
Substitute. 
SPEAKER: Okay. So you want --
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REPRESENTATIVE URE: Yes. 
SPEAKER: The motion is we reconsider our 
action on First Substitute Senate Bill 123. 
REPRESENTATIVE URE: Correct. 
SPEAKER: Do you want to speak further to 
that? 
REPRESENTATIVE URE: After the bill was 
passed out yesterday we — we read the last lines in 
the bill to where it can be interpreted many different 
ways; and to make it read cleanly, and thoroughly, we 
decided we better make those amendments. And that's 
why we1re bringing the bill back is to place those 
minutes in and make it read more clearly. 
SPEAKER: Okay. Further discussion to the 
motion to reconsider? 
Seeing none, Representative Ure for 
summation. 
REPRESENTATIVE URE: I would waive that. 
SPEAKER: Motion is we reconsider our action 
on having voted on the prevailing side. 
Representative Ure moves that we reconsider action on 
First Substitute Senate Bill 123. 
Discussion -- those in favor of the motion 
say aye. 
(AYES HEARD.) 
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1 SPEAKER: Opposed say no. 
2 I Motion passes. 
3 The bill is -- bill will be reconsidered and 
4 I is before us. Representative Ure. 
5 SENATOR EVANS: Mr. Speaker, I would move 
6 the amendment -- is Amendment No 4, but I only want to 
7 do Amendment 4. Everything above I want to delete, but 
8 I only Amendment No. 4, which is -- says page five, lines 
9 123(C) through 123(F). 
10 SPEAKER: Okay. The motion is that we amend 
111 this bill via Amendment No. 4, under 
12 Representative Urefs name. 
13 1 There are four items on the amendment, and 
14 he is only proposing the fourth item. He is not 
15 proposing the first three. Is that correct? 
16 REPRESENTATIVE URE: Correct. 
17 SPEAKER: Do you want to speak to that? 
18 REPRESENTATIVE URE: If you want to slip 
19 over on to -- to the first substitute, I'll show you 
20 exactly why I bring this back. 
21 On page -- or on line 123(d), it says 
22 Listing the inherent risks -- and we're talking about 
23 signs. We don't want to put a sign out here and then 
24 list 30 different inherited risks, because no one would 
25 I ever read it, and it would be all messed up anyway. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
We just wanted to designate a sign saying, 
Warning, we have problems, or whatever it might be, but 
not list all of the -- all of the different inherent 
risks. 
And the amendment that I have proposed 
straightens that out so it just reads a sign out there. 
And that's the justification of bringing it back. 
SPEAKER: Further discussion? 
Seeing none, Representative Ure for 
summation? 
SENATOR EVANS: I waive that, please. 
SPEAKER: Summation is waived. 
The motion is that we amend -- we place the 
amendment in Representative Urefs name. It's Amendment 
No. 4, and only item four on the amendment. 
Those in favor of the motion say aye. 
(AYES HEARD.) 
Those opposed say no? 
Motion passes. 
Those in favor of Chris Vanocur getting a 
tie on, raise your hand. 
Opposed, say no. 
All right. Thank you. That passes. 
Further discussion to the bill as amended? 
Further discussion to the bill as amended? 
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ll MR. VANOKER: I have none. 
2 SPEAKER: Thank you, Representative Ure, for 
3 I summation. 
4 REPRESENTATIVE URE: I was glad that Chris 
5 I Vanocur was moved anyway. 
6 1 I would waive summation, please. 
7 SPEAKER: Summation is waived. 
8 I Voting is open on First Substitute Senate 
9 I Bill 123 as amended. 
10 Seeing all present as having voted, voting 
11 will be closed. 
12 j (Whereupon, the recording 
was concluded.) 
13" 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
• * • 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY SIEGWART, ; 
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vs. ] 
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD.; ; 
SUNDANCE HOLDING, LLC: ] 
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE, INC.; ] 
ROBERT REDFORD; ] 
REDFORD 1970 TRUST; 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OUTFITTERS, L.C.; 
and DOES I-X 
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> FINDINGS OF FACT, 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
» ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
I MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
} DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
> ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE-BASED 
) CLAIMS 
) Civil No.: 080400019 
1 Judge Claudia Laycock 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court as regularly scheduled on January 
19, 2010, at 10:30 a.m., before the Honorable Claudia Laycock. Robert Strieper of the Strieper 
Law Finn appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. H. Burt Ringwood of Strong & Hanni Law Finn 
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appeared on behalf of the Defendants. The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs* Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum, Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, and having considered the arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 1,2007, Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri and two friends went to 
Sundance for a guided horse ride. 
2. Prior to the ride, Lisa signed a Release & Indemnity Agreement 
(hereinafter "Release"), which reads, in relevant part: 
RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - READ CAREFULLY BEFORE 
SIGNING 
I, the undersigned, and if I am a person under 18 years of age, my parents and I 
(hereafter "Rider") understand that horseback riding, sleigh riding or horse 
drawn wagons (collectively "Horseback Riding") involve SIGNIFICANT RISK 
OF SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVEN DEATH. 
The risks include NATURAL, MAN-MADE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
AND INHERENT RISKS, including changing weather, mud, rocks, variations in 
steepness, terrain, natural and man-made obstacles, equipment failure and the 
negligence of others. "Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock activities 
means those dangers or conditions which are an integral pari of equine or livestock 
activities, which may include: (a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that 
may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them; (b) the 
unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, 
sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals; (c) collisions 
with other animals or objects; or (d) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent 
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to 
maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability. Sundance 
shall have no liability for inherent risks, 
-2-
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In consideration of participation in the Horseback Riding and use of 
SUNDANCE'S facilities, I agree to the following: 
1. I expressly agree to assume ail risks of personal injury, falls, accidents, 
and/or property damage, including those resulting from any negligence of 
Sundance Partners Ltd., Sundance Holding LLC, Sundance Development 
Corporation, Sundance Institute, Inc., Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, 
Rocky Mountain Outfitters, L.C., their agents, employees, property owners, and 
affiliated companies (herein collectively "SUNDANCE"). 
2. Release & Indemnity. To the fullest extent allowed by law, I agree to forever 
release SUNDANCE from any and all claims for injuries, losses, and damages 
resulting in any way from "Horseback Riding" use of Sundance facilities, 
SUNDANCE'S negligence. My release includes all claims regarding the design, 
maintenance, manufacture, instructions, or conditions of the Horseback Riding area, 
course, structures or equipment utilized in the Horseback Riding, express or implied 
warranties, product liability and the negligence of SUNDANCE. To the fullest 
extent allowed by law, I agree to indemnify and hold SUNDANCE haniiless from all 
claims, damages or injuries in any way related to my participation in Horseback 
Riding or use of any facilities at SUNDANCE, including breach of this Release, and 
will reimburse SUNDANCE'S attorneys' fees and costs, even if SUNDANCE was 
negligent. 
* * # 
7. I HAVE READ, UNDERSTOOD AND VOLUNTARILY SIGNED THIS 
RELEASE OF LIABILITY. 
Signature of Rider: I si Lisa Penunuri Date 8/1/07 
(Emphasis original.) 
3. During the ride, Lisa fell from her horse and sustained personal injuries 
(hereinafter "the Accident"). 
4. Lisa Penunuri was 48 years old at the time of the Accident. 
5. It is undisputed that Lisa signed the Release prior to the horseback ride. 
6. It is also undisputed that Lisa signed the Release voluntarily. 
-3-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah courts have long recognized the general validity of preinjury 
releases. Russ v, Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Cl. App. 1995) ("[generally, 
parties . . . may properly bargain against liability from harm caused by their ordinary negligence . 
2. In three recent cases, the Utah Supreme Court has "reaffirmed [Utah's] 
position with the majority of states that people may contract away their rights to recover in tort 
for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of others." Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation. 
179 P.3d 760,765 (Utah 2008); see ajso, Berrv v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 171 P.3d 442 (Utah 
2007); Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 175 P.3d 560 (Utah 2007). 
3. While Utah subscribes to the majority view upholding the validity of 
preinjury releases, exceptions to that rule exist when the release offends public policy. 
4. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 175 
P.3d 560 (Utah 2007) and its invalidation of apreinjury release on the grounds of public policy, 
as reflected in the Inherent Risks of Skiing Act, does not apply in this case. 
5. Of great significance to the Rothstein court were the legislative findings 
and expressions of public policy contained in section 78-27-51. 
6. Unlike the Inherent Risks of Skiing Act, the Equine Act contains no 
statement or section declaring Utah's public policy. The Equine Act sets forth no legislative 
findings or expressions of public policy, which was precisely what the Rothstein court found so 
significant and which formed the basis for its holding. 
-4-
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7. Nothing in the plain language of the Equine Act suggests that an equine 
activity sponsor may not, by contract, limit their liability for non-inherent risks. 
8. This Court declines Plaintiffs' invitation to stray from the plain language 
of the Equine Act and read into the Equine Act restrictions that exist nowhere in the actual text. 
9. The Court finds that the Release signed by Lisa is valid and enforceable as 
to all of Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence-based claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that all of 
Plaintiffs' claims, except for the claim of gross negligence, fail as a matter of law. 
ORDER 
1. The Court finds that because the Release is valid and enforceable, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2. Based on the above findings and conclusions, all of Plaintiffs' claims, with 
the exception of the claim of gross negligence, are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
3. Because Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence-based claims do not overlap 
Plaintiffs* claim for gross negligence, the Court finds there is no just reason for delay and directs 
entry of final judgment in favor on Defendants in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
-5-
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DATED thislfo day of _ 
Approved as to Form: 
^AAJKAAU^ 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
11 M\Ai^ 
Honorable Claudia 
District Court Judge 
Roben D. Strieper 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Court of Appeal s of Utah. 
Lisa PENUNURI and Barry Siegvvart, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD.; Sundance Hold-
ings, LLC; Sundance Development Corp.; Robert 
Redford; Robert Redford 1970 Trust; and Rocky 
Mountain Outfitters, LC, Defendants and Ap-
pellees. 
No. 20100331-CA. 
June 9,2011. 
Background: Participant in guided horseback ride 
brought claims against operator for negligence, 
gross negligence, and vicarious liability for guide's 
conduct, alleging participant fell from horse when 
horse unexpectedly accelerated to catch up with 
group. The Fourth District Court, Provo Depart-
ment, Claudia Lay cock, J., dismissed claims based 
on ordinary negligence, based on participant's re-
lease and indemnity agreement. Participant ap-
pealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Voros, J., held that 
the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Live-
stock Activities Act did not preclude a pre-injury 
release of liability for ordinary negligence. 
Affirmed. 
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court on that principle is to invite judicial mischief. 
*1050 Robert D. Sirieper, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellants. 
H. Burt Ringvvood and A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees. 
Before Judges DAVIS, VOROS, and CHRISTI-
ANSEN. 
OPINION 
VOROS, Judge: 
S 1 Lisa Penunuri appeals the trial court's order 
denying her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Sundance Partners, LTD, and other named 
appellees (collectively, Sundance) and dismissing 
as a matter of law her claims based on ordinary 
negligence. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
5 2 On August 1, 2007, Penunuri and two 
friends participated in a guided horseback ride op-
erated by Sundance. The party consisted of five 
riders and one guide. The riders were arrayed in 
single file with the guide in front and Penunuri in 
the rear. The rider directly in front of Penunuri was 
an eight-year-old girl. The girl had problems con-
trolling her horse; as a result, gaps formed in the 
train of riders. To keep the train together, the guide 
informed the riders that she would hold the reins of 
the eight-year-old's horse. However, before the 
guide could do so, Penunuri's horse suddenly accel-
erated to catch up with the other horses. The unex-
pected acceleration allegedly caused Penunuri to 
fall off her horse and suffer serious injuries. Sund-
ance's instructional manual for horseback riding 
guides cautioned that horses that lag behind tend to 
accelerate quickly to catch up with the group. 
5 3 Before participating in the ride, Penunuri 
signed a Release & Indemnity Agreement (the Re-
lease), which purported to release Sundance from 
any claims arising from its ordinary negligence: 
I expressly agree to assume all risks of personal 
injury, falls, accidents, and/or property damage, 
including those resulting from any negligence of 
Sundance.... 
J 4 Penunuri filed suit against Sundance al-
leging negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious 
liability. She then filed a Motion and Memorandum 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Re-
lief, arguing that the Release is unenforceable under 
the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Live-
stock Activities Act (the Equine Act), see Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-4-201 to -203 (2008). The trial 
court ruled that the Equine Act did *1051 not pre-
vent a party from contracting away its liability for 
ordinary negligence and thus ruled the Release en-
forceable. It accordingly dismissed all of Penunuri's 
claims based on ordinary negligence. Penunuri ap-
peals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
5 5 Penunuri contends that the trial court erred 
by denying her motion for partial summary judg-
ment and by ruling that the Release was enforce-
able. More specifically, she argues that the plain 
language of the Equine Act prevents an equine 
sponsor from limiting its liability for ordinary neg-
ligence with a pre-injury release. In addition, she 
argues that public policy as expressed in the Equine 
Act prohibits such releases. 
| i |(2| 5 6 Summary judgment is appropriate 
where "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We 
"review[ ] a trial court's legal conclusions and ulti-
mate grant or denial of summary judgment for cor-
rectness and viewj j the facts and all reasonable in-
ferences drawn therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party." Bingham v. 
Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37. J 10, 235 P.3d 
730. In addition, "[w]e review questions of stat-
utory interpretation for correctness giving no defer-
ence to the trial court's interpretation." In re S.C.. 
1999 UT App 251,5 8, 987 P.2d 611 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
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ANALYSIS 
|3 | |4] |5 | 5 7 "In general, the common law dis-
favors agreements that indemnify parties against 
their own negligence because one might be careless 
of another's life and limb, if there is no penalty for 
carelessness." Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94.51 14. 
37 P.3d 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Nevertheless, generally, "those who are not en-
gaged in public service may properly bargain 
against liability for harm caused by their ordinary 
negligence in performance of [a] contractual duty; 
but such an exemption is always invalid if it applies 
to harm wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or 
wanton negligence:' hi. J 9 (quoting 6A Arthur 
Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 1472, at 
596-97 (1962)). Thus, in Utah, as in a majority of 
states, generally "people may contract away their 
rights to recover in tort for damages caused by the 
ordinary negligence of others." Pearce v. Utah Ath-
letic FonmL. 2008 UT 13, 3 14, 179 P.3d 760; see 
also Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 2007 UT 96,11 6, 
175 P.3d 560 ("We have joined the majority of jur-
isdictions in permitting people to surrender their 
rights to recover in tort for the negligence of oth-
ers."). 
5 8 Penunuri first contends that the plain lan-
guage of the Equine Act renders the Release unen-
forceable. She also contends that the Release of-
fends public policy established by the Equine Act. 
We consider each contention in turn. 
A. The Language of the Equine Act Does Not In-
validate the Release. 
[6||7][8| J 9 "To interpret a statute, we always 
look first to the statute's plain language in an effort 
to give effect to the legislature's intent, to the de-
gree it can be so discerned." In re Olympus Consfr., 
LC. 2009 UT 29, S 10, 215 P.3d 129. To determine 
the meaning of the plain language, we examine the 
statute "in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." LP! Servs. v. McGee, 
2009 UT 41,8 11,215 P.3d 135 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Moreover, " 'effect must be given, 
if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a 
statute.... No clause 1,1 sentence or word shall be 
construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the 
construction can be found which will give force to 
and preserve all the words of the statute.' " State v. 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123, J 53,63 P.3d 621 (omission 
and alteration in original) (quoting 2A Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:06 
(4th ed. 1984)). 
J 10 Penunuri contends that the Release viol-
ates the express terms of the Equine Act. Section 
202 of the Equine Act shields an equine sponsor 
from liability for the inherent risks associated with 
equine activities, unless the sponsor engages in 
negligence, gross negligence, willful or wanton dis-
regard for the safety of the participant, or intention-
ally injurious conduct: 
*1052 An equine activity sponsor, equine profes-
sional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock 
professional is not liable for an injury to or the 
death of a participant due to the inherent risks as-
sociated with these activities, unless the sponsor 
or professional: 
(a)(i) provided the equipment or tack; 
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; 
and 
(Hi) the equipment failure was due to the 
sponsor's or professional's negligence; 
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determ-
ine whether the equine or livestock could be-
have in a manner consistent with the activity 
with the participant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession 
and control of land or facilities upon which the 
participant sustained injuries because of a dan-
gerous condition which was known to or 
should have been known to the sponsor or pro-
fessional and for which warning signs have not 
been conspicuously posted; 
(d)(i) commits an act or omission that consti-
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tutes negligence, gross negligence, or willful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of the parti-
cipant; and 
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or 
(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to 
the participant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B~4~202(2) (2008) FN i (emphasis added). 
FN I. This section was renumbered and 
amended after the instant case arose, but 
the relevant portions have not changed. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202 amend, 
notes (2008). We cite to the current ver-
sion of the statute for the reader's conveni-
ence. 
5 11 Penunuri argues that the "plain language 
provides that [Sundance) is not to be held liable for 
inherent risks associated with equine activity yet 
must be held liable for its acts or omissions of neg-
ligence." (Emphasis added.) She further argues that 
enforcing the Release "would make everything after 
'unless' in [section 202(2) ] superfluous." Sundance 
responds that while the Act is designed to ensure 
that equine activity sponsors would not be liable for 
specified inherent risks, "nothing in the Act sug-
gests that the Legislature intended to change or al-
ter the liability of equine sponsors for noninherent 
risks or the contractual protections that might be af-
forded to them through a release." As noted above, 
Utah case law recognizes that pre-injury releases 
releasing a party from liability for its own negli-
gence are generally enforceable. Thus, in effect, 
Penunuri asks us to read section 202 to overrule 
that case law insofar as equine and livestock activit-
ies are concerned. 
J 12 The principal obstacle to reading section 
202 to invalidate pre-injury releases is that it does 
not mention releases. " Accordingly, if section 
202 invalidates pre-injury releases, it does so by 
implication only. As it applies to this case, section 
202 is clear that an equine activity sponsor is pro-
tected from liability for the injury or death of a par-
ticipant due to the inherent risks of equine activity 
unless the sponsor is negligent, grossly negligent, 
or worse. But what then? According to Penunuri, 
once negligence is established, the Equine Act 
mandates liability, subject only to statutory de-
fenses. According to Sundance, once negligence is 
established, the Equine Act ceases to apply, and the 
case becomes a garden variety negligence case con-
trolled by the rules governing such cases, including 
common law defenses. 
FN2. The same is true of the legislative 
history to which Penunuri directs our at-
tention. 
|9| J 13 Reading this language to abrogate 
common law defenses, invalidate pre-injury re-
leases, and mandate liability stretches the statutory 
language past its plain meaning. We agree with 
Sundance and the trial court that section 202 pro-
tects a sponsor from liability arising from the inher-
ent risks of equine activities unless the sponsor is 
negligent, in which case it offers no protection. 
However, the sponsor remains free to assert all oth-
er applicable defenses, including, if appropriate, re-
lease. The "unless" clause thus defines the limit of 
the Act's benefits to sponsors; it does not impose 
new burdens upon them. The Equine Act therefore 
*1053 leaves undisturbed case law permitting spon-
sors to contractually limit their liability for acts of 
ordinary negligence. See generally Russ v. Wood-
side Homes. Inc., 905 P.2d 90K 904 (Utah 
Ci.App.1995) ("Generally, parties ... may properly 
bargain against liability from harm caused by their 
ordinary negligence."). This reading does not 
render the language following "unless" superfluous, 
as Penunuri argues. That language is still given its 
desired effect, which is to circumscribe the protec-
FN 3 tions offered by the Equine Act. 
FN 3. Because our supreme court has de-
clined—albeit in a noncommercial set-
ting—to "extend strict liability to owners 
and keepers of horses," see Pullan v. Stein-
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men. 2000 UT 103.11 7. 16 P.3d 1245, one 
might question whether the negligence ex-
ception to the Equine Act's coverage cir-
cumscribes its protections to the point of 
rendering them illusory. 
i 101 S 14 Thus construed, section 202 is in har-
mony with section 203 of the Equine Act. See LP! 
Servs. v. McGee. 2009 UT 41, S 11, 215 P.3d 135 
(stating that statutes are to be read in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter). Section 203 re-
quires equine or livestock activity sponsors to 
provide notice to participants that the sponsor is not 
liable for certain inherent risks of the equine activ-
ity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-203O) (2008). 
This notice may be provided by posting a sign in a 
prominent location or by "providing a document or 
release for the participant ... to sign." Id. § 
78B-4-203(2)(b) (emphasis added). We do not read 
the word "release" in this section to refer merely to 
a document notifying the participant that the spon-
sor is insulated against claims arising from certain 
inherent risks of participating in the activity. Be-
cause the statutory term "document" already con-
veys this meaning, such a reading would imper-
missibly render "release" redundant. See State v. 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123,S 53, 63 P.3d 621... Further-
more, a release does more than provide notice. 
"The main purpose of a release typically is the vol-
untary relinquishment of a claim or right by one 
who, absent the release, could have enforced such a 
claim or right." 66 Am Jur.2d Releases § 1 (2010). 
We therefore conclude that section 203 presupposes 
the continued use of releases between equine activ-
ity sponsors and participants. Given the other provi-
sions of the statute, a release in this context can 
have only one purpose, which is to release in ad-
vance a sponsor from liability for that sponsor's or-
dinary negligence. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the plain language of the Equine Act does not inval-
idate the Release. 
B. Public Policy as Expressed in the Equine Act 
Does Not Invalidate the Release. 
111 li 121[13| J 15 Penunuri next contends that 
the Release violates public policy as expressed in 
FN4 the Equine Act. ' It is well settled that preinjury 
releases must be compatible with public policy." 
Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, J 15, 
179 P.3d 760. However, we proceed with great cau-
tion when considering whether to invoke public 
policy as a basis for judicial determinations: 
FN4. Penunuri does not argue that the Re-
lease violates public policy under the so-
called Tunkl standard. See generally 
Hawkins v. Peart. 2001 UT 94, J 9 n. 3, 37 
P.3d 1062 (discussing the public policy 
standard set forth in Tunkl v. Regents of the 
University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92. 32 
Cal.Rplr. 33. 383 P.2d 441. 445-46 (1963) 
). 
[PJublic policy is a protean substance that is too 
often easily shaped to satisfy the preferences of a 
judge rather than the will of the people or the in-
tentions of the Legislature.... [TJhe theory of pub-
lic policy embodies a doctrine of vague and vari-
able quality, and, unless deducible in the given 
circumstances from constitutional or statutory 
provisions, should be accepted as a basis for judi-
cial determinations, if at all, only with the utmost 
circumspection. 
Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp,, 2007 UT 96. J 10, 
175 P.3d 560 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Fairfield his. Co. v. Stephens Martin 
Paving. LP, 246 S.WJd 653, 672 (Tex.2008) 
("[PJublic policy ... is a very unruly horse, and 
when once you get astride it you never know 
where it will carry you." (quoting Richardson v. 
Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 
294,303)). "For a contract to be void on the basis 
of public policy, there must be a showing free 
from doubt that a contract is against public 
policy." *1054Ockey v\ Lehmet\ 2008 UT 37. 5 
21, 189 P.3d 51 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
|14| J 16 Generally, "our public policy does 
not foreclose the opportunity of parties to bargain 
for the waiver of tort claims based on ordinary neg-
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ligence." Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 
87,1) 15. 171 P.3d 442, However, Penunuri argues 
that the Equine Act establishes a public policy pro-
hibiting an equine sponsor from limiting its liability 
for negligence via a pre-injury release. She analo-
gizes to the Utah Supreme Court's invalidation of a 
pre-injury release based on public policy grounds 
under Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing Act (the Ski-
ing Act). See generally Rothstein. 2007 UT 96, 175 
P.3d 560; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-5! to -54 
(2002&Supp.2007). 
5 17 In Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 
96, 175 P.3d 560. a skier collided with a retaining 
wall and was injured. See id. 11 1. He sued the ski 
resort, alleging negligence. See id. The trial court 
granted the ski resort's motion for summary judg-
ment based on two release and indemnity agree-
ments signed by the skier. See id. J 5. The agree-
ments provided that the skier waived all claims, 
"including those caused by [the resort's] negli-
gence." IcL 1j 4. The supreme court reversed in a 
3-2 decision, holding that the releases violated pub-
lic policy as declared in the Skiing Act. See id. 5 1. 
3 18 The first section of the Skiing Act con-
tains an extensive statement of its public policy un-
derpinnings: 
"The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is 
practiced by a large number of residents of Utah 
and attracts a large number of nonresidents, sig-
nificantly contributing to the economy of this 
state. It further finds that few insurance carriers 
are willing to provide liability insurance protec-
tion to ski area operators and that the premiums 
charged by those carriers have risen sharply in re-
cent years due to confusion as to whether a skier 
assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. 
It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify 
the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks 
inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of 
law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, 
and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, 
no person engaged in that sport shall recover 
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from 
those inherent risks:' 
Id. J 12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 
(2002 & Supp.2007)). Based on that public policy 
statement, the Rothstein court observed that the Le-
gislature found it "necessary to immunize ski area 
operators from liability for injuries caused by inher-
ent risks because they were otherwise being denied 
insurance coverage or finding coverage too expens-
ive to purchase." Id. 5 14. The court thus reasoned 
that "[t|he central purpose of the [Skiing] Act ... 
was to permit ski area operators to purchase insur-
ance at affordable rates." Id. J 15 A public policy 
"bargain [was] struck by the [Skiing] Act," the 
court held, which provided that "ski area operators 
would be freed from liability for inherent risks of 
skiing so that they could continue to shoulder re-
sponsibility for noninherent risks by purchasing in-
surance." Id. S 16, Because the purpose of the Ski-
ing Act was to provide ski resorts with the ability to 
purchase affordable liability insurance, the court 
held that the Legislature had determined that ski re-
sorts could not "use pre-injury releases to signific-
antly pare back or even eliminate their need to pur-
chase the very liability insurance the [Skiing] Act 
was designed to make affordable." Id. Accordingly, 
the court held that the releases offended public 
policy. See id. 
1151 5 19 Penunuri argues that the Equine Act 
"was intended to mirror" the Skiing Act and that 
the two acts are "nearly identical." She argues, 
therefore, that the Equine Act struck the same bar-
gain as the Skiing Act and thus prohibits pre-injury 
releases for negligence. Penunuri points out that 
both statutes "limit participants from recovering 
from inherent risks of the sport. Both define the in-
herent risks as those that are integral to the sport. 
Both acts require that the operator or sponsor post a 
sign listing the inherent risks. Both acts permit a 
participant to recover from acts of the sponsor or 
operator's negligence." Notwithstanding those sim-
ilarities, however, only the Skiing Act includes a 
declaration of public policy. That public policy de-
claration was *1055 the centerpiece of Rothstein. 
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From it, the supreme court gleaned "ftjhe central 
purpose of the |Skiing] Act," id. II 15, and extrapol-
ated "the bargain struck by the [Skiing] Act," id. 5 
16. which supported its ultimate holding that Snow-
bird's releases were invalid. See id. "Few legislative 
expressions of public policy speak more clearly to 
an issue," the court noted, "than the public policy 
rationale for Utah's ... Skiing Act speaks to prein-
jury releases for negligence." Id. 3 1I > The Equine 
Act has no equivalent statement of public policy. In 
fact, it has no statement of public policy at all. We 
are instead left with only the text of the Equine Act 
from which to deduce a public policy. Roiksiein it-
self warns that "[t]o pluck a principle of public 
policy from the text of a statute and to ground a de-
cision of this court on that principle is to invite ju-
dicial mischief." Id. 3 10. Consequently, we decline 
+ . FN5 M 
to do so. 
FN5. In Street v. Darwin Ranch, inc., 75 
F.Supp.2d 1296 (D.C.Wyo.1999), a rider 
suing a dude ranch for a fall from a horse 
on a trail ride sought to invalidate a pre-
injury release based on the Wyoming Re-
creation Safety Act. See id. at 1297. Simil-
ar to the Equine Act, the Wyoming Recre-
ation Safety Act shields providers of recre-
ational activities from claims based on the 
inherent risks of those activities. See id. 
(citing Wyo, Star. Aon. § 1—1—123 (1999)). 
The court concluded, "The Release is, at 
the very least, consistent with the public 
policy expressed by the Act, if not in fur-
therance of it." Id. at 1300-01. 
cordingly, while the supreme court in Rothstein had 
a basis in the Skiing Act to invalidate pre-injury re-
leases, we see no equivalent basis in the Equine Act 
for doing the same. 
3 21 Affirmed. 
3 22 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Presiding 
Judge and M1CHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2011. 
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CONCLUSION 
3 20 The plain language of the Equine Act 
provides statutory protection to equine sponsors for 
inherent risks of equine activities. The portion of 
the Equine Act excluding negligent, grossly negli-
gent, and intentional acts from its protection does 
not invalidate pre-injury releases of ordinary negli-
gence. In addition, while the Equine Act and the 
Skiing Act share a number of similarities, only the 
latter features a declaration of public policy. Ac-
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